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Native Brits are, by and large, a tolerant, easy-going lot, the young especially, and more so now than ever before, and this is surely a good thing to be. Certainly, far more so than those Muslims who would rather be governed by the laws of a religion that regards unbelievers as inferiors than by those of the country in which they have made their home. The trouble is that in the noble exercise of tolerance, the UK's political representatives and institutions, as in other nations of a similar liberal disposition, sometimes permit and even justify conduct that should not be tolerated. Let us be clear, we are referring to behaviour, not the expression of beliefs and opinions, which should be as much the right of Muslims as anyone else. The toleration by public authorities of abuses both within the 'Muslim community', such as female genital mutilation, bigamous, child and forced marriages and the like, and outside it, with the grooming and gang rape of non-Muslim girls, has multiple causes - political correctness, fear, the courting of the Muslim vote, corruption. Even naivety plays its part, being the mistaken assumption that like everyone who has come to the UK to live, Muslims, despite the inevitable political, cultural, linguistic and religious differences that they bring with them, share essentially the same values, or in time will come to do so, as the host nation. Serious deviations from this norm are therefore ignored or explained away, rather than confronted, which in today's political climate can easily lead to accusations of racism.

We should also bear in mind that until the last thirty years or so, the assumption that integration would proceed naturally over the generations has proved to be a sound one. Successive waves of immigration, going back as far as the persecuted Calvinist French Huguenots in the 16th century, have enriched British society in numerous ways and, over time, the descendants of those who first settled in the UK have integrated and even assimilated by marriage into the society of their hosts. Even when retaining certain elements of their native culture, successive generations have not in any sense mounted a challenge to the UK's political and legal institutions. Being in many cases the victims of persecution in their countries of origin, they were only too willing to embrace a political culture that afforded them not only a safe haven, but equality under the law, a free and decent education for their children, free health care and the opportunity to earn a living and play a part in the democratic process. Tragically for all concerned, the last three decades have provided clear indications that this is not the case with many Muslims. But this was not so initially. The first post-war wave of Islamic immigration into the UK, mainly from Pakistan, was in most ways like those that preceded it. Together with Sikhs and Hindus from India, they found employment, mainly low-paid, in industry and services. The father of Labour's Muslim Mayor, Sadiq Khan, was a bus driver. Many joined trade unions and, obviously in smaller numbers, the Labour Party.

This pioneer generation was as hard working and law abiding as any other migrant group that had made its way to Britain's shores. And while remaining Muslims (though not in the main, excessively devout), and to a large degree (like most newcomers to a strange land) living separate lives from their hosts, there was every reason to assume, based on the history of previous migrations, that if not

they, then their children and certainly their grandchildren, would follow the same path of gradual but irreversible integration. However, it was not to be. External events in the Islamic world, primarily the Middle East and Iran, began to exert what has proved to be an irresistible force of attraction acting on young British Muslims, enticing many to follow a path utterly different from earlier generations. 1979 witnessed Iran's 'Islamic revolution', establishing for the first time in the modern era an Islamic theocracy, and one moreover with political ambitions that reached far beyond its borders. But it was Ayatollah Khomeini's *fatwa* of 1989, the death sentence imposed on Salman Rushdie, that brought young Muslims on to the streets in their thousands against a book none had read, but had cheered to see burned, feeling outraged and betrayed by those who defended the author in the name of a freedom of expression that was utterly alien to their religion and culture.

For the first time, young British Muslims were now experiencing the thrill and sense of power that only militant street action and media attention can create. At that moment, the process of integration, so far as the younger generations of Muslims were concerned, came to a halt. Then, in response to the invasion of Iraq in 1991 after Saddam's seizure of Kuwait, followed by 9/11 and the ensuing US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the integration process went into reverse. Egged on and organised by an emerging Sharia left, the increasing political mobilisation of young Muslims was dragging some of the older generations in its wake, via their mosques and by organisations such as the Muslim Association of Britain. As advocates and even fighters for theocracy, large numbers of young Muslims, unlike the first generation of Islamic migrants, openly began to denigrate man-made democracy and human rights. Again, unlike their forebears, their religious zeal has led them to opt out of the UK's political system, preferring to take to the streets in demonstrations against Israel, organised by Corbyn's Palestine Solidarity Campaign and, as we have seen, by answering the call of Jihad either in Syria or as 'lone wolf' assassins in the UK.

It must be said that in this respect, they have not been set the best of examples by those of their elders who claim to speak for the UK Muslim diaspora. Some local Muslim politicians have proved to be out and out gangsters, as in the case of Tower Hamlets, and vote riggers, as in Peterborough's council elections of 2004, and by-election of 2019, practices that would not raise an eyebrow in any Islamic state which allows elections but, until the emergence of Muslims onto the political scene, were vitally unknown in the UK. Can it be mere coincidence that all large-scale electoral fraud (tactfully explained by the Electoral Commission as due to a 'lack of understanding of the electoral process') occurs in areas of substantial and long-established Muslim populations? The problem of political corruption is not confined to local politics. As we have seen on several occasions, Muslim politicians at Westminster, when faced with the choice of advancing either their religion or their party, opt for their faith, prompting the suggestion that it would have surely been more honest, and have shown more respect for voters, even if less likely to advance their political careers, if they had stood for office on an Islamic ticket rather than, like the far left, exploit the electoral machine of a mainstream party to which they have no real loyalty.

In politics, as in life generally, there is much wisdom in the old saying that one cannot serve two masters. Come 9/11 and military clashes erupting between Israel and its Arab and Islamic enemies, the stage in the UK was set for the forging of

today's anti-Zionist 'popular front'. As we have seen, Muslim support for an avowedly anti-Semitic, even genocidal Islamic Jihadism, with its goal of theocracy, became the order of the day, together with hatred for all things western, especially the USA and, of course Israel and the Jews. Here too, as we have also seen, the Sharia left made the necessary adjustments, simply echoing and justifying even the most racist and primitive prejudices of its young Muslim marching companions. But this was not simply a clash of generations, in the sense of a rite of passage in which the son, to prove his manhood, feels obliged to rebel against his father. It of course includes that, but it is so much more. Their revolt was not just against something, but for something, which they truly saw as holy, sacred. In Islam, they found a purpose to both life and death, a cause, a call to action, even to Jihad, not, like their parents and grandparents, as merely a code to live by and a call to prayer. Azzam Tamimi of the 'moderate' Sharia left partner, the British Council of Muslims, captured this new-found devotion to the cause perfectly when he objected to the description of Jihadis as 'suicide bombers': 'Do not call them suicide bombers. Call them martyrs. We love death. They [the Jews] love life.'

In the holy texts on which their parents and imams have reared them, young Muslims find a message that, for all the protestations, denials and theological gymnastics of clerics and politicians, is really there, and which undeniably does indeed clearly summon the Muslim male to do battle, literally, on behalf of his faith. Only this, and not the spurious motives others proffer, can explain the surge of young British Muslims who made their way, by devious routes, to the ISIS killing deserts of Syria and Iraq. They left behind them, often for good, and in some cases at least, genuinely bewildered parents, who were at total loss as to why their loved ones were choosing to kill and be killed in a faraway desert rather than achieve academic and professional success, settle down and in time provide then with grandchildren. Always, they described their runaway Jihadi offspring as 'good Muslims', not comprehending for one moment that if they were bad Muslims or not Muslims at all, they would still be safely at home with their parents.

Yet the answer as to why they became assassins is so obvious, so simple, that only a Muslim parent could not grasp it. Brought up from the cradle to be 'good Muslims', that is, to believe that every word of the *Koran* is true, 'good Muslims' is exactly what they believed they were now proving themselves to be, not by study, then a beginning a career, followed by buying a home and begetting children, in the process becoming more British than their parents but, just as the *Koran* commanded, by leaving behind the old, the infirm and the fainthearted, and earning by death in battle the rewards that await the martyr in Paradise. As we have seen, that is precisely what the *Koran* urges and promises and, sure enough, devout young Muslims, not just in the UK, but throughout Europe, answered the call in their tens of thousands. The following small selection of verses from the *Koran* urging Jihad are taken from just Chapters 2 and 3. (a fuller selection, numbering 61 is provided in Appendix L) All told, Koranic scholars have identified a total something in the order of 170, though politicians, US academics and Christian clerics, in the first place the current Pope, have detected none:

'Fighting is ordained for you, though it may be repugnant to you.' (2: 217)
 'Those who believe and those who emigrate [sic] and strive hard in the cause of Allah, it is these who hope for Allah's mercy.' (2: 219) 'And fight them until there

is no more persecution, and religion is professed only for Allah.’ (2: 194) ‘Do you suppose that you will enter Heaven while Allah has not yet caused to be distinguished those of you that strive in the way of Allah and has not yet cause to be distinguished as steadfast?’ (3: 143) ‘We shall cast terror into the hearts of those that have disbelieved.’ (3: 152) ‘And if you are slain in the cause of Allah or you die surely forgiveness from Allah and mercy are better than what they hoard.’ (3: 158) ‘Think not of those, who have been slain in the cause of Allah as dead. nay, they are living in the presence of the Lord, and are granted gifts from him.’ (3: 170)

While there is, in defiance of these and many other similar citations, a public consensus among all sectors of the political and clerical establishment that nothing in the teachings of Islam justifies acts of violence, this does not hold true for the criminal justice system and in its courts of law, where evidence and the truth still matter. We have seen that in a number of cases involving Muslims charged with terrorism offences, evidence presented in court by the prosecution to prove criminal intent has included passages from the *Koran* which defendants had invoked to justify acts of terror against infidels. At least here, evidence, realism and a refusal to defer to political correctness still prevail. The same is however not true of the Prison Service. In July 2016, the BBC reported that after a review of prison libraries conducted in 2015 by a team led by Ian Acheson, a senior Home Office official and former prison governor, five Islamic texts stocked by libraries were identified as ‘extremist’ for their advocacy of Jihadism. In nine of the eleven prisons inspected, one or more of these texts had been found in chaplaincy rooms. Acheson first conveyed his concerns to the Ministry of Justice in November 2015, and again in March 2016, but to no effect. The release of his report on his findings was also repeatedly delayed. The order to remove the texts in question was eventually made on June 20, 2016. Perhaps one of the reasons for the delay in publication and action was that one of the texts Acheson believed was responsible for encouraging Jihadism contained numerous citations from the *Koran*. Giving evidence to the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, Acheson expressed both unease and surprise that the Ministry of Justice had taken so long to act on his recommendations: ‘I made it clear to the Ministry of Justice last November that my assumption was that urgent action will be taken to remove these materials. Their free access to vulnerable and suggestible prisoners is an obvious security risk.’ Could it be that political correctness was taking precedence even over national security?

Among the texts scheduled for removal was *The Way of Jihad* [sic!] by the Hitler-admiring founder of the theocratic Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Banna. In his preface, the author asserts that ‘Jihad is an obligation from Allah on every Muslim and cannot be ignored or evaded’. In the main body of the work, Al-Banna then cites certain passages from the *Koran* that validate this claim, for example: ‘Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of Allah and your enemies’, (8: 60) and ‘Verily Allah has purchased of the believers their lives and their properties; for the price that is theirs shall be the Paradise. They fight in Allah’s cause, so they kill others and are killed.’ (9: 11) UK tax-paying readers may be interested to learn that this particular verse, one that like so many others from the same source, incites Muslims to kill non-Muslims, is included in the Ministry of Justice-approved manual for Islam courses taught in HM prisons since

2011. (Why such courses are needed is another question.) Given that the *Koran* contains over a hundred similar injunctions to take up arms for Allah, for the ban on Jihadist literature to be truly effective, Islam's holiest text would have to be removed from every prison in the UK, or expurgated to render it innocuous.

No less a matter of concern to Acheson was the discovery that of the 244 Muslim chaplains operating within the prison system, no fewer than two thirds were adherents of the Deobandi school of Islam, which also controls around 40% of the UKs registered 1,750 mosques and many of its 2,000 *madrassahs*. Preaching its own version of multi-culturalism, Deobandism advocates the strictest possible segregation of diaspora Muslims from their *kuffar* hosts and, sharing a close association with Wahhabism, promotes Jihad against the infidel West. Particularly influential in Pakistan and Afghanistan, its teachings inspired the founding of the Taliban. One of its private schools, situated in the heavily Islamised former Yorkshire mill town of Dewsbury, was found by a Sky News investigation to be inculcating in its 140 pupils the belief that there existed a Jewish conspiracy to conquer the world, an exercise justified by the school's management as 'spiritual training for the soul'. The school also prepared its pupils for martyrdom in the name of Islam, with teaching materials exhorting Muslims to 'expend even life for Allah's just order'. Is it any wonder then that 1000 or so young UK Muslims, exposed on such a scale to these doctrines, in many cases learned from early childhood by rote at *madrassahs*, turned ISIS Jihadis, comprising possibly the largest contingent, one quarter of the total, from any western country?

What hope integration when so many of a rising generation see as their role models Jihadis who video beheadings to cries of god is great? Surely it is time to realise that after the UK has done everything within reason and, in pursuing the follies of 'multi-culturalism', even beyond, to accommodate the followers of Islam, infidels are now seen by many Muslims, and with some justification, both as dupes to be milked while remaining enemies of Islam. To repeat, the *Koran* is quite explicit: 'Surely the vilest of animals in Allah's sight are those who disbelieve.' (Chapter 8, Verse 55) 'Ye who believe take not the Jews and the Christians as friends' (Chapter 5, Verse 52); and 'O ye who believe, take not others than your own people as intimate friends; they will spare no pains to ruin you. They love to see you in trouble. Hatred has already shown itself through the utterances of their mouths and what their breasts hide is greater still.' (Chapter 3, Verse 119) It is difficult, if not impossible, to see how these condemnations and commands can further the process of integration of young Muslims into the broader society in which they or their antecedents have chosen to live, especially when they are also incited by their leaders to do exactly the opposite. In 2008, the then Turkish Prime Minister, and now Islamising President Recep Erdogan addressed a meeting of 20,000 diaspora Turks in Cologne: 'I understand very well that you are against assimilation. One cannot expect you to assimilate. Assimilation is a crime against humanity.'

Faced with this organised resistance to integration, the response of public policy has been to accommodate the demands, laws and mores of Islam, a policy that in Sweden, resulted in native Swedes effectively being reduced to second class citizens in what was once their own country. (For details, see Appendix C) One of the most frequently rehearsed explanations for the failure of Muslims to integrate is that the young in particular feel 'alienated', as if this was somehow not

the inevitable consequence of Islamic teachings and diaspora preferences, but the fault of the host nation. One way to respond to this complaint is to offer the Muslims of the UK an alternative to the status which they, along with all other UK subjects, currently enjoy or rather, complain of. The deal would go like this. The UK would offer to its resident Muslims a carbon copy of the same Sharia law that a true Islamic state would impose on *dhimmi* non-Muslims in its own domain. As a legally Christian country with its own state church, the UK would confront Muslims with three choices, just as Islam does non-Muslim monotheists: convert to Anglicanism, accept the second-class status of Muslim *dhimmis* and pay the tax, or suffer death as Muslim martyrs. (There would also be a fourth option of emigration within in a set time period.) Any Muslim converting to Anglicanism and then reverting back to Islam would be killed as an apostate. By strictly enforcing an inverted carbon copy of Islamic *dhimmitude*, non-converting Muslims accepting this status, in addition to paying the *dhimmi* tax, would not be allowed to

- 1: build any new Mosques in the UK;
- 2: pray or read out aloud from sacred Muslims texts in any place where this may be heard by Anglicans;
- 3: reproduce Islamic holy texts, and sell them in public places;
- 4: Display religious symbols on their houses or places of worship;
- 5: Use the media in any shape or form to promote their faith;
- 6: Gather in public for a religious purpose;
- 7: To serve in the armed forces, unless engaged as mercenaries under Anglican command.

If these conditions of servitude were to be enforced on the UK's Muslim population, it would not be too hard to predict the inevitable reactions. In the UK, there would ensue entirely legitimate Muslim massive protests, joined by many others who shared their outrage at these measures. I would be among them. They could quite easily spill over into violent clashes in several of the UK's largest cities. There would be a world-wide Muslim boycott of all UK goods and services. Ambassadors of Muslim countries would be withdrawn. The UN which, by accepting without protest a religious monopoly of Islam in Saudi Arabia, violates its own Universal Declaration of Human Rights, would convene an emergency session to protest against the UK's violation of Islamic religious freedom, while its Human Rights Council would also call an emergency session to pass scathing resolutions of condemnation and find the UK guilty of umpteen human rights violations.

The Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference would likewise convene emergency sessions to the same end. Overnight, the UK would become a pariah state in the eyes of not only Muslims but the entire world. Abroad, vast armies of outraged Muslims would storm and reduce to rubble UK embassies in fifty or more Islamic capitals. The mayhem, destruction and carnage would dwarf any that Muslim mobs have unleashed in past responses to a cartoon, a film or novel most had neither seen, read or could have read. And all because the UK had decided to treat Muslims in the same way that Sharia law and the *Koran* require Islamic states to treat those who are not Muslims. And yet there never have been, and probably never will be, analogous resolutions, boycotts and street

mobilisations against the very real and mounting persecution of religious minorities imposed in countries governed by Sharia law, under which religious toleration, like so many other aspects of Islam, is a one-way street, demanded as of divine right by Muslims in the lands of the infidel, but denied by Allah to infidels in his own realm: 'Fight them [the unbelievers] until there is no more persecution [of Muslims] and religion is professed only for Allah.' (*Koran*, Chapter 2, Verse 194)

Sometimes, 'Islamisation' has its absurd, even comic aspects, though the following examples also have a deadly serious dimension, since they illustrate the mounting assault being mounted by Islam, with the connivance of a range of public authorities, on the increasingly restricted right to free speech. That offensive has resulted in a series of court rulings and convictions in the UK that are flagrant violations of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to which the UK was a signatory, but which in order to appease its Eurosceptics, the Conservative Party committed itself to repudiating. Article 10 is defined thus:

Everyone [sic] has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. In a commentary on this article arising from case law, the Court has ruled that Article 10 'protects not only the information and ideas that are regarded as inoffensive but also those that shock, offend or disturb, such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broad mindedness without which there is no democratic society.' Opinions expressed in strong or exaggerated language are also protected.

In Article 10 of the European Convention, yes, but not in the courts of the UK where they can be judged as crimes meriting in some cases prison terms of up to seven years. In the May 2014 elections for the EU Parliament, a candidate for the anti-Islam Liberty GB Party was reading out aloud from a book by Winston Churchill while standing on the steps of the Winchester Guildhall. The work in question was Churchill's *River War*, an account of the British campaign against the Sudanese Mahdi at the close of the 19th century, in which Churchill played a prominent role as an army officer. The work, containing views arrived at through first-hand experience of the Islamic faith (see Appendix I) and its impact on those who adhere to it, would, by today's less robust standards of what constitutes free speech, certainly qualify as 'Islamophobic'. And so it proved. The reading was brought to an abrupt halt following a complaint to the police by a Guildhall official, who almost certainly was unaware of the identity and therefore legendary reputation of its Nobel Literature Prize winning author, whose leadership in the Second World resulted (deservedly in my opinion) in his being voted the 'Greatest Briton' by BBC viewers, and is the only British commoner ever to have been awarded a state funeral. No matter. Charged with the offence of 'religious *and* racial harassment' no less, even though the reading made no reference to race, only Islam, and the complaint had not been made by a 'harassed' Muslim, the offender was arrested, searched (presumably for more incriminating writings by Churchill) and bundled into a van by a *posse* of no fewer than seven policemen. After having his fingerprints taken, providing a DNA sample and spending several hours in a cell, he was released, still facing racial hate speech charges carrying a

maximum prison sentence of two years. Though the charges were subsequently dropped, the fact that they had led to an arrest is an indication that Islam is being afforded a level of protection not accorded to any other belief system.

Naturally, the Thought Police action won approval from Muslims, for whom free speech exists only to propagate Islam and to demand the silencing and punishment of those who dare to criticise it. Mohammed Shafiq of the Ramadan Foundation, whom we earlier encountered demanding of infidels not only respect for but the 'celebration' of his faith, put it thus: 'Of course [sic] there should be freedom of speech, but [there is always a 'but'] with freedom of speech comes responsibility'. How easily 'of course' trips from the tongue. Translated from an Orwellian Shariaspeak into less opaque and more honest prose, Shafiq was saying that we Muslims do not like criticism of our religion, and so we demand the right to be the judges of what can and cannot be said about it. As Rafiq was well aware, that is exactly how the matter is handled in Islamic countries, where freedom of speech and religion are only conspicuous by their total absence. The Shafiqs of this world want the same system of censorship to operate in the west, in the guise of demanding 'responsible' free speech. Who decides what is 'responsible'? Who enforces it? And 'responsible' to whom? We can guess. The only responsibility that comes with free speech is firstly to defend it, come what may, and to exercise it, irrespective of whom it may offend. Free speech qualified by a 'but', as it so often is, is no longer free speech.

One can easily imagine what the reaction of a genuine feminist would be to any man who said 'of course I am against wife-beating, but...' In fairness, I should point out that this duplicitous stance on the right to free expression is shared by many non-Muslims, not least those on the left. When, some twenty-five or so years ago, in an article on Lenin that I wrote for the quasi-Trotskyist *New Interventions*, I took the Bolshevik leader to task for reneging on his party's pre-revolution pledge to uphold freedom of the press 'to its last drop of blood', the journal's editor replied in the next issue that 'Yes, we are all for freedom of the press, but Blick does not seem to consider that in some circumstances certain newspapers should be closed down'. George Orwell would have loved that one! In the same breath, 'all for' and 'close down'. What these 'circumstances' might be, and the identity of the 'certain papers', was left unsaid, though the principle and object of the exercise itself were manifestly clear. Should we then be surprised that given this shared denial of the unqualified right to freedom of expression, the Leninoid totalitarian left and far right theocratic Islam would prove such amicable bed-fellows?

To take two examples. Um Ibtihal, in the website *Islamic City*, after noting with concern that some Muslims living under repressive Islamic regimes are attracted to the idea of freedom of speech, made it clear that 'Islam does not allow the adoption and propagation of "Freedom of Speech" as propagated in the West, since this would permit the promotion of such ideas that contradict Islam'. He then (again) invokes the Henry Ford 'black car' principle: 'This is not to say that Islam does not allow the Muslims to express their opinions freely.' However, that is exactly what it does do, as what follows, makes clear: 'But [always the 'but'] this opinion must be derived from the *Koran* and *Sunna* [words and deeds] of the prophet Mohammed'. So much for 'freely'...just like the editor of *New Interventions*...any opinion you like, so long as it is Islamic, or his case, Leninist. Our second commentary is to be found in the website '*Brotherhood and*

Unity'. And yes, it is indeed the precise theocratic analogue of Lenin's post-revolution dictum that press freedom, far from the birth right of the proletariat, 'helps the force of the world bourgeoisie'. Freedom of speech, we are informed, is 'a colonial tool', a concept

derived from the capitalist [sic] ideology that is based on the belief that God and religion should be separated from life's affairs...the right to speak and what are the limits of free speech are therefore all defined by human beings. This view completely contradicts Islam. In Islam, it is the creator of all human beings, Allah, who gave the right [surely, in view of the context, faculty] of speech to people and the limits on what is acceptable and unacceptable speech.

Muslims who might be tempted to venture beyond these limits are warned that Allah has installed a celestial Sharia Big Brother audio monitoring system by which 'every word a human being speaks is recorded by the two angels Kiraman [and] Katibeen' so that 'even the speaking of one "bad" word may lead someone to the hellfire.' While being resolutely opposed, like Lenin, to unfettered 'colonialist' and 'capitalist' free speech, and yet always demanding that 'capitalist', infidel laws be used to silence and punish those that fail to display the required respect for their faith, Islamic clerics expect the *kuffar's* police to protect them when they exercise their Allah-given right to applaud acts of terror against this same 'colonial' and 'capitalist' enemy. And of course, our *dhimmi* police duly obliged. The date was September 11, 2002, the location, Jeremy Corbyn's favourite Finsbury Park Mosque, and the event, a celebration of the first anniversary of the killing by 19 Muslims of nearly 3,000 victims in their suicide attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre in New York. Around 1000 Muslims crowded into the mosque to celebrate mass murder, pray to their warrior god and hear sermons of hate against the west. On this occasion, however, the police were there to protect the exercise of what they evidently regarded as 'responsible' freedom of speech, unlike a Churchill text criticising Islam, which belongs to the 'irresponsible' category.

Travelling west from Winchester, we find ourselves at Taunton in Somerset. There, Michael Overd, a Christian lay street preacher, was arrested and charged, under one of the UK's speech crime laws, with preaching a 'religiously aggravated' sermon, ironically the identical fate that befell the founder of his religion, if the Biblical account of his life is anything to go by. It is difficult to see how Overd's guilt could have been in any doubt, in the light of the testimony given by one witness for the prosecution. The preacher had, she claimed, made 'defamatory comments' about Mohammed and, horror of horrors, made 'no mention of any good' in the Islamic faith. So, cuff him. The legal implications of this trial were potentially truly horrendous, that in order to remain within the law, public speakers could be obliged to balance any adverse comments they might dare to make about Islam with an equal number that are favourable, even if it involved, as it necessarily would, inventing them. There is also another aspect of this prosecution that needs to be considered. As we have already noted, the 57 Islamic states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference had been pressing for the United Nations to make it a criminal offence, binding on and enforceable within all its member countries, to defame Islam and its prophet. The Taunton trial was just that, a blasphemy trial by another name, in which adverse comments

made about Islam and Mohammed were regarded as sufficient evidence to warrant criminal proceedings against the person who made them.

As *kismet* would have it, how appropriate that the presiding judge in this trial should be another Muslim, Shamim Qureshi, who in his other legal capacity, played a leading role as a judge in the UK's publicly financed and gender-biased Sharia court system. All this was bad enough. But what followed was worse again. Before Overd had even begun his sermon, it transpired that a police officer had warned him, 'If I hear one homophobic word out of your mouth here today, I will arrest you'. Quite aside from the contentious issue of how a single word can be 'homophobic', there is the more important matter to consider of a police officer, note book or perhaps recording device in hand, monitoring every single word uttered by a public speaker, and ready to pounce if, in his judgement, just one of those words violated a speech crime law. No less a cause for concern was the same police officer's subsequent warning to Overd that though he had a right to free speech, this had to be exercised without offending anyone - precisely the kind of 'responsible free speech' Muslims seek, with the support of the far left, to enforce on those who do not share their exalted opinion of Islam.

How can anyone addressing a gathering of people whose beliefs and opinions cannot possibly be known in advance to the speaker, be able, with the certainty demanded by this officer, to guarantee that they will not say anything that could offend anyone in the audience? This is impossible. The only way to comply with this instruction is to say nothing, which is exactly the result Muslim offence-takers seek. But there is yet more. Next, we come to what must be the most alarming feature of the many that comprised this judicial assault on free thought and its free expression. A police officer present in court took time out to speak to the journalists who were covering the trial. He invited them, in words that cannot be construed in any other way, to encourage the public, as they were in Nazi and then Stalinist [East] Germany, to become informers on their fellow citizens. This, verbatim, is what the officer said: 'I'd advise people that if they are offended to record any incident on their mobile phone and send it to us.' Does this require any comment? In the event, Overd was found guilty of using 'abusive' language and ordered not only to pay the costs of his trial, rated at £1,200, but damages to one of the passers-by whom, it was claimed, he had offended, to the tune of £250. If this is not an incentive, indeed, an incitement, to be offended, what is? He rightly chose to appeal against his conviction and elected to stand trial again before a jury.

That the Sharia judge found the preacher guilty is in itself outrageous enough, as was his financial reward to the allegedly offended party for choosing to be offended. But his closing remarks had a sinister ring that those who value what remains of their civil liberties can ill afford to ignore. In the course of his sermon, Overd had quoted from the Old Testament of the Bible, Leviticus, Chapter 20, Verse 13: 'If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall be surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them.' As it was reading out aloud this particular verse that helped secure the preacher's conviction, the Muslim judge told Overd that he should have selected another verse instead. This was indeed rich coming a Judge whose religion, to say the least, has a no less condemnatory attitude towards homosexuality than the Bible's, and to this day punishes it with the same penalty. He also warned Overd that his offence carried the option of a prison sentence...for

reading from the Bible. So, just as in the Churchill case, the courts can if they choose prosecute and, if they see fit, convict anyone reading aloud in public a passage from a book that is not only in general circulation but, in this case, in its King James version, is beyond any dispute the prime text in the English language and, in various versions, is still to be found in the UK in millions of homes, thousands of public and academic libraries, in schools and hotels, and in every Anglican Church, from which are made readings no different from that of Overd's, in all serious bookshops and, what is more, is still the chief doctrinal authority of the established Church of England, at whose head stands the *Fidei Defensatrix*, His Majesty King Charles. A Judge, a Muslim judge of all people, tells a Christian preacher what can and cannot be read out from this book in public. Just imagine the reverse, a Christian judge, or better still, a Jewish one, giving the same instruction to a Muslim preacher! How have we managed to abase ourselves to the point when a pathological fear of anyone giving offence results in a preacher being arrested and convicted for reading from the Bible?

Although the guilty verdict was on appeal overturned at Bristol Crown Court, there was a sting in the tail. When, subsequently, Overed commendably brought a civil action in the same court against Avon and Somerset police for, quote, 'wrongful arrest, battery, trespass to the person, malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office and infringement of human rights' (magnificent), the judge dismissed all these claims on the grounds that the police had acted lawfully! Is so, why was the verdict overtured? The speech police also acted lawfully in April 2021, when they arrested, handcuffed and frog marched to a police car 71-year-old Pastor John Sherwood, who had been preaching outside Uxbridge underground station. They were responding to complaints that he had been making, as the police put it, 'homophobic comments'. What he had been doing, had those ignoramuses who made the complaints known it, was reading from the same Leviticus, Chapter 20, Verses 13. Once again, publicly reading from the Bible, the foundational text of England's official religion, can be sufficient grounds for arrest in the UK, as it once was in the Soviet Union, and still is in countries ruled by Sharia law, not to speak of Andrew Murray's 'People' Korea', the world's only official atheist state. Somehow, I cannot conceive of a similar response if the reading on the same subject had been from the *Koran* or a *hadith*.

An almost identical fate befell a group of street preachers in Redditch, as reported in the Redditch and Alcester Advertiser of December 12, 2020. A group of Christian Street preachers proclaiming that 'homosexuals are going to hell' were reported to the police by a member of the public. 'They had placards saying "all sinners are going to burn in hell" ...I turned around and challenged them and said they can't cherry-pick scriptures from the Bible to suit their bigoted beliefs. [Who says they can't?] I said they were nothing but bigoted racists [first Muslims were a race, and now, gays are] and had no right to spout their hate speech in public. Then I called 101.' (101 was by happenstance also the number of the room where those guilty of Thought Crime were subjected to torture by Big Brother in Orwell's 1984.) What law says it can be a crime to quote in public from the Bible? Is it not the teaching of the holy book of the Church of England that unrepentant sinners go to hell, and that homosexual acts are sinful? If this can be preached in an Anglican church, and the relevant Biblical texts 'cherry-picked' as readings for a lesson, why not in public? For example, in addition to Leviticus we have Romans 1: 27, which refers to the sin of men who, 'leaving the natural use [sic] of

women, burned in their lust toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly...' Is it now one of the responsibilities of our under-staffed and funded police to determine which Biblical cherries can or cannot be picked in public? Legally or not, as they did in Taunton and Uxbridge, the speech police sprang into action, announcing that they were treating the incident as a 'hate crime' and that 'an investigation is underway'. Displaying on-line the same Leviticus passage on homosexuality, photocopied from a Bible, led in January 2022 to the trial in Finland of a Lutheran MP on a charge of 'hate speech', despite the official status of Finland's Lutheran church. It was left to the court to decide if quoting from the Bible could constitute a crime. Why not cut to the chase, and ban it, as they do in Saudi Arabia? In the event, in keeping with Finland's liberal tradition and values, the jury said it could not. not.

Now to that religious hot spot, Belfast, where on 18 May 2014, another preacher, Pastor James McConnel, delivered in his church a sermon that he also publicised on line. Its subject was Muslim persecution of Christians, and everything he said about their sufferings and the religion of persecutors was true:

Allah is a heathen deity. Allah is a cruel deity. Allah is a demon deity. A deity that this foolish government of ours pays homage to and subscribes financial inducements to curry their favour, while in Muslim lands Christians are persecuted for their faith. Their homes are burned, their churches destroyed, and hundreds [in fact thousands] of them literally have given their lives for Christ in martyrdom. A lovely young Sudanese woman by the name of Miriam, 27 years of age, because she has accepted Christ as her Saviour, will be flogged publicly and hanged publicly...I know the time will come in this land and in this nation when to say such things will be an offence to the law.... Islam is satanic. Islam is a doctrine spawned in hell.

The time he warned of had already arrived, in fact it had come more than a decade previously, as the Pastor quickly discovered when, acting on a complaint by the Belfast Islamic Centre, police charged him under a totalitarian thought crime law, dating from 2003, with the offence, which carries a prison term of up to six months, of 'sending, or causing to be sent, by means of a public electronic communication network, a message or other matter that was grossly offensive'. Speaking the truth about Muslim persecution and murder of Christians 'grossly offensive'? No such proceedings ensued when Channel Four exposed calls by Birmingham imams for the murder of homosexuals and Muslims who did not pray the required number of times per day. Instead, it was Channel Four who were the subject of an eight months investigation by the CPS, accused of distorting the message of the preachers' sermons. (See Chapter 16)

Pastor McConnel, unlike many of our higher clerics, was made of sterner stuff than the clerical quislings who turn a deaf ear to cries for help from their Christian brothers and sisters, hunted down, raped, tortured and murdered in their thousands for their faith by the zealots of the religion of peace, compassion and tolerance. Unrepentant for expressing views that are integral to his own chosen faith, he made it clear that the target of his invective was not people, but ideas that he sincerely believed to be both false and wicked: 'I have nothing against Muslims. I have never hated Muslims. But I am against what Muslims believe.' My view exactly. He continues: 'They have a right to say what they believe in and I have a right to say what I believe in'. If only this last were true! His prosecution, and

others like it, proved that when the subject is Islam, it is not. Rather than accept the option of a lesser punishment, Pastor McConnel elected to stand trial, and was ready to risk a six-month term in prison: 'I am 78 years of age and in ill health but jail has no fear for me. They can lock me up with sex offenders, hoodlums and paramilitaries and I will do my time.' In which event, would Sharia-friendly Amnesty International have adopted him as a Prisoner of Conscience?

Obviously more concerned to placate Belfast's outraged Muslims than permit freedom of speech and conscience to its Christian preachers, the Prosecution announced that it would be calling no fewer than eight (we can safely assume deeply-offended Muslim) witnesses. This was obviously a test case, and the Belfast Islamic Centre intended to win it. The Centre's Executive Director Raied al-Wazzam told the BBC that the Pastor's sermon had contained 'inflammatory language and it is definitely not acceptable'. Acceptable to whom? Here we have the Islamic veto being exercised yet again, with a Muslim laying down the (Sharia) law as to what can and cannot be said by non-Muslims about Islam, not only in a non-Islamic country, but one that is officially Christian. He and others like him were, with the full support of the law courts, deciding what constituted 'acceptable' or, as another cleric put, 'responsible' speech, the criteria always being, what is acceptable to Muslims under Sharia law. With each new case, entire branches of UK law were, by stealth and precedent, not only accommodating Sharia law, but becoming extensions of it. Raied al Wazzam had complained of the Pastor's 'inflammatory language'. He should know. Some months later, in January 2015, he gave another interview to the BBC, in which he proclaimed himself to be an admirer of the Islamic State: 'Since the Islamic State took over Mosul, it has been the most peaceful city in the world'.

With such impeccable theological credentials, it was only to be expected that Raied al Wazzam would be chosen by the CPS as its chief witness in the trial of Pastor McConnel. I am pleased to record that on this occasion, Pastor McConnel was found not guilty by a judge who, by his verdict, obviously placed a higher value on free speech than appeasing professional Muslim offence takers. Even so, the Pastor would have been outraged to learn, if he did not already know it, that as the law on 'hate crime' has thus far been interpreted, it could be a crime for a person to burn in public, without endangering either property or other persons, their own copy of a *Koran*, while the same did not hold true for a copy of the Bible. In November 2010, a 15-year-old Birmingham school girl was arrested and accused of 'inciting religious hatred' after burning a *Koran* in her school's playground. Two months previously, after being 'tracked down' by the *Daily Mail* (as the paper proudly reported) six masked Gateshead men were arrested after posting a video of themselves burning a copy of the *Koran* in a protest against 9/11.

Commenting on the two cases, Catherine Heseltine, Chief Executive Officer of the Muslim Public Affairs Committee, explained that 'the *Koran* is the most sacred thing to over a billion Muslims worldwide...we will never destroy the Koranic texts'. Nobody was saying they should. As her 'we' clearly refers to Muslims, and Muslims alone, it therefore follows that non-Muslims are in no sense, legally or otherwise, obliged to display the same reverence for a book that they do not believe in. If someone chooses to burn their own property in the shape of a book in a manner that is totally legal in all other respects, that should be entirely their own affair, as indeed it is in the USA under the First Amendment. It

is also allowed in the UK, when the book is *The Satanic Verses* and those burning it in public are Muslims, but not when the book in question is the *Koran*, and those burning it are infidels. Defending the right to do something, as I do in this instance, is not the same as approval of the said act, a distinction most Muslims and now our courts simply seem incapable of making. Although there was no place in Rousseau's Utopia for a free press, he is justly famed for his retort, when it was one of his own writings, the novel *Emile*, that was consigned to the flames by the Calvinists of Geneva, that 'burning is no answer'. Book burning, historically associated with the Roman Catholic Inquisition and the Nazis, and more recently with Muslim mobs outraged by a book they have not read (and in most cases, could not read) or an image they have probably not seen, is not only stupid, futile and uncivilised, but demonstrates a refusal or inability to engage rationally with ideas with which one disagrees. But that should not be grounds for making it a crime when it is one's own book that is being destroyed without risk to persons or property. Here again in such cases, we see a blatant attempt by UK law officers to use the courts to enforce Sharia blasphemy laws.

Just how crazy and the same time menacing these legal restrictions on free expression have become (all of which, significantly, have a religious dimension) was demonstrated by another extraordinary case that came to court in the UK in March 2015. As we have seen over and over again, politicians in the UK, as they do world-wide, insist there is no causal connection between Islam and terrorism, and anyone who makes such a linkage is guilty of defaming the religion of peace. But it seems there can be exceptions to this otherwise universal truth. And, as we might have expected, these exceptions, far from allowing the defaming of Islam, work in its favour. To appreciate how, consider the following: In that month, Liam Edwards appeared in Manchester Magistrates court, charged with 'racially aggravated criminal damage'. From the wording, one would reasonably infer that Edwards had maliciously damaged in some way, property belonging to a member of an ethnic group other than his own, and that his motive for doing so was that of racial hatred. But one would be wrong. Nothing of the kind occurred. Not remotely. Describing himself as an 'animal lover', and like millions of other non-Muslims, though not the *dhimmi* Green Party, Edwards was opposed to the unnecessarily cruel ritual slaughter of animals, having witnessed it in a TV documentary on the subject. Seeking to draw attention to the issue, he entered a Sainsbury supermarket, and affixed stickers to *Halal* products and supermarket trolleys belonging to Sainsbury, which read thus: 'Beware! Halal is barbaric and funds terrorism. Ban Halal'. While the first accusation was a matter of opinion, the later has been proven to be true.

The entire case against Edwards rested on these words printed on the stickers, and nothing else that he had said or, apart from affix his stickers, done. There was no allusion to, let alone mention of, a race or races. Terrorism is not a race any more than is halal meat. That is why Edwards only pleaded guilty to criminal damage, as not all the stickers could be removed from the *Halal* products, resulting in a loss to Sainsbury of £16.50 in sales revenue. But he pleaded not guilty to the 'aggravated racial' component of the charge, which was referred to trial by jury at a later date. As his defence council correctly pointed out in support of his not guilty plea, 'he used the word terrorism, but that cannot denote race or indeed religion'. Indeed, it cannot. And are we not told over and over again that there is no connection between Islam and terrorism? But here is the

ironic twist to the whole affair; the prosecution case rested on the assumption that there was! The additional objection could have been made that such 'damage' as there was done was to the property of Sainsbury, a company, and not a race, a point that that I will expand on below. The specific charge brought against Edwards in this case, '*racially aggravated* criminal damage', carries with it the implication that just the combined public display of the words 'halal' and 'terrorism' could be actionable in a court of law, for otherwise, why was Edwards not simply charged with criminal damage? And why introduce 'race' into the proceedings, when the alleged allusion was to a religion? One suspects that this case has a great deal more to do with protecting the 'sensitivities' of Sainsbury's Muslim customers than the loss of £16.50 to Sainsbury shareholders, a loss that was readily made good by Edwards being required by the court to pay this sum in damages to the company.

The sane amongst us are left puzzling: How does a sticker, one that mentions neither Islam nor a race, but refers disapprovingly to a method of killing animals, and makes the allegation (not surely in and of itself a criminal offence, and for which there are moreover reasonable grounds) that revenues from the *Halal* meat industry are funding terrorism, constitute a *racially* motivated offence? If, in the eyes of law, it does, then which race is being aggravated, so to speak? Bear in mind that the stickers were only attached to chickens and trolleys legally belonging to Sainsbury. So, was Sainsbury claiming not only to have suffered damage to its property (which in the case of the chickens was true and conceded to be such by the defendant) but also to have had inflicted '*racially aggravated*' damage, rather than just damage *per se*, on its *chickens*? Was Sainsbury, a company, claiming either itself, its trolleys or its chickens to be a race? Surely not. Yes, it was their property that was damaged, but precisely who had been '*racially aggravated*' remained a mystery. Let us assume for sanity's sake that it was not Sainsbury, its trolleys or (dead) chickens, that had been the victim suffering the '*racially aggravated*' component of the charge, but rather that a Muslim customer had made a complaint to the effect that they had been '*racially aggravated*' on reading the offending sticker, even though, as we have noted, there was no reference to Islam or even allusion to race in the wording. So, we have damage to Sainsbury property in the form of one or more chickens, but no '*racial aggravation*' to the same party; and a presumed '*racial aggravation*' to a hypothetical Muslim customer or customers (no such customer was called as a witness) of an unspecified and therefore possibly same race as the accused, but no damage to a potential customer's property, since the damaged chicken(s), being unsellable, still belonged to Sainsbury.

What legal chicanery, worthy of a Kafka novel! It leaves one wondering as to the motives of those who decided that this case had to be brought to court, not as one of simple damage to property, which it was, but as one which, we must presume, involved a spurious charge of giving offence to Muslims even though only race was mentioned in the indictment, not religion, let alone Islam. Could it be that the learned minds that shape and administrate our laws had yet again fallen for the oldest trick in the Sharia book, and been duped into believing, or at least into pretending to believe, that a protean Islam, when it suits its purpose, can be simultaneously a race, a religion and, it seems, even a chicken? But if it can metamorphose itself thus, which race had it in this case become? A *racially* motivated act has to be directed at a person or persons belonging to a specific

race, not at an idea or belief system, such as Islam is. Otherwise, how can it be racist? So again, we must ask, which race was targeted by the wording on the stickers? Edwards was found guilty of both charges, ordered to pay £160.00 in addition to the £16.50 to Sainsbury, *and given a one-month curfew from 9.00 PM to 7.00 AM...* just for fixing stickers on a few Sainsbury chickens. This verdict could set the precedent of making all protests against Halal ritual slaughter liable to prosecution under existing 'hate crime' laws, violations of which can carry a prison sentence of up to seven years.

In Australia, when snowflake Muslims claimed they were offended by the words 'Non-Halal Certificated' in an Adelaide butcher's shop window, the Advertising Standards Board ruled that it be removed, as it was 'demeaning to people of that faith [i.e., Islam] or are of Muslim ethnicity. [sic]' Again, Islam is simultaneously a faith and a race. The traumatised Muslims claimed the sign, displayed because customers were constantly asking if the shop's products were halal, 'poked fun of [sic] a specific group of people based on religious belief', thereby 'perpetrating a culture of vilification towards religious minorities'. Refusal to remove the sign, which poked fun at no-one, but simply provided information regarding some of the shop's products that had been requested by its customers, would result in a fine of \$20,000. However, there is no redress in law for those offended by the sight of butchers advertising halal, and neither should there be. Rather, it is ritual slaughter itself that should be outlawed, whether it be Jewish or Muslim..

Calling Halal ritual slaughter 'barbaric' was also one of the sins that in February 2019 got student Sebastian Walsh into hot theological water at the *dhimmi* University of Central Lancashire, along with expressing opposition in a class discussion to the Islamisation of Britain and free health care for non-UK citizens, views which, as he said, 'are held by many people in the public'. But not to be voiced and contested in a place of supposedly higher learning. Instead, like tale-telling school children... 'please Miss, Tommy said "bum"', infantilised adult snowflake snitches ran to Sir and had Walsh suspended and required to undergo 'diversity training', which he refused to do. Finally, to take one more no less crazy case, in 2006, schoolgirl Codie Scott found herself in court on a charge of racist 'hate speech', when all she had done was to state a fact. Her crime consisted of saying she found it hard to communicate with Pakistani classmates engaged with her in a joint project because they didn't speak English. No doubt they also found it hard to communicate with her because she didn't speak Urdu. But that was not considered a crime. This happened, not in Pakistan, but England.

That such cases can come to court, let alone result in successful prosecutions, while Muslim rape gangs can go unpunished for decades, should be a cause for satisfaction for those who wish to silence criticism of Islam that the UK's formidable battery of hate crime laws is achieving its objective. But when it comes to combating 'Islamophobia', some people are never satisfied, one being the former Labour Party leader Ed Miliband. With Muslim votes possibly holding the balance in what all believed at the time would be a close-run General Election, in an interview with Ahmed Versi, editor of the *Muslim News*, he promised that if elected, a Labour Government would 'change the law on this [Islamophobia] so we make absolutely clear our abhorrence of hate crime and Islamophobia. It will be the first time that police will record Islamophobic attacks right across the country'. (This proposal was subsequently adopted by Cameron, who in October

2015 announced the introduction of a national police register of convicted Islamophobes akin to the sex offenders' register.)

Nowhere in the interview did Miliband explain what he meant by 'hate crime' and 'Islamophobia', or what constituted an 'Islamophobic attack'. If by 'attack' Miliband meant GBH, grievous bodily harm, common assault or ABH, which includes threats of violence as well as actual violence against a person or persons who just happened to Muslims, or deliberate damage to property belonging to such, then no new laws were required. Therefore he seemed to be implying that such attacks were 'Islamophobic' if they were deliberately directed against a person or persons not only known by the attacker to be Muslims, but *because* they were Muslims. But he did not say this. So, one is left to draw the conclusion that his 'attack' applied to actions that are not physical assaults or threats of such, but the expression of ideas and opinions, conveyed either verbally, or in written, printed, electronic and pictorial form, that can be construed as evidence of 'Islamophobia', resulting in those responsible being liable to criminal prosecution and entered on a register of convicted Islamophobes. Much therefore hinges on the meaning of the term 'Islamophobia'. The Runnymede Trust first introduced the word in 1991, ten years before 9/11, defining it as an 'unfounded hostility towards Muslims, and therefore fear or dislike of most Muslims.' Who decides what is 'unfounded'? The use of this word also carries with it the implication that there can be 'hostility' towards and 'fear or dislike' of Muslims for reasons that are not 'unfounded'. And, as this definition pertains not to a belief system, Islam, but to those who believe in it, Muslims, actual people, why not 'Muslimphobia'? And why not 'Christianphobia' for those who in various ways display less than the required respect for Christians? No such word exists, and I am confident it never will. The on-line Oxford Dictionary offers the following definition of Islamophobia: 'Dislike [of] or prejudice against Islam or Muslims, especially as a political force'. Here, Islam is included together with Muslims, with all manner of implications, not least legal. But adding to the confusion, the same Oxford dictionary defines 'phobia' as an 'extreme or irrational fear or aversion to something'. So what happened to 'irrational fear' in its definition of 'Islamophobia'? The definition is also, from the standpoint of free speech, dangerous in the extreme, since, as is the case in Canada and several European countries, Islamophobia is classified as a 'hate crime'. And fearing (irrationally or otherwise) or disliking a person or group of persons as defined by their religion does not necessarily mean that they will be treated prejudicially. First, there has to be the opportunity to do so. And even then, it may well not happen, because in and of themselves, fearing and/or disliking someone, or a group of people, is a feeling, not an action. How then can it be a crime? The phrase, 'especially as a political force' adds nothing to the definition, and in fact confuses the issue further, since Muslims, who though like members of all other faiths, hold a wide variety of political opinions, define themselves only by their religion, as does the law.

Demos, the cross-party 'Think Tank', while avoiding the usual reference to anti-Muslim prejudice, still contrives to get the meaning wrong, defining Islamophobia not as fear, irrational or otherwise, but as the propagation of 'anti-Islamic ideas'. In what sense is the propagation of an idea a 'phobia'? For example, is a (traditional) feminist who advertises her (negative) feelings about the *Koran's* sanctioning of wife-beating and marital rape an Islamophobe? The

first example of Islamophobia offered is a tweet that runs thus: ‘Morocco deletes a whole section of the Koran from school curriculum as it’s full of jihad incitement and violence the Religion of peace.’ The first part of the quote is simply a statement of fact, and the second, what could be taken as an ironic comment on the first, an appropriate one, as many do call Islam ‘the religion of peace’. And the *Koran* does indeed contain scores of Jihadi ‘incitements to violence’. (See Appendix L). So where is the ‘phobia’? What we have here is not fear, irrational or otherwise, but an attempt at satire. Now the second, also a tweet: ‘I hate fucking Pakis’. Here we do have hatred, but not fear. And the hatred is explicitly directed against the people of a certain nation, not their religion. He did not say, ‘I hate fucking Muslims (though he may well have done), but ‘I hate fucking Pakis’, as indeed do millions of (Hindu) Indians and (Muslim) Bangladeshis. So how is this an example of Islamophobia? Is this the best that the combined brains of Demos can produce? Where Islam is concerned, the tank seems to have sprung a large leak. What is common to all these definitions of Islamophobia, and any number of others I could have cited, is the strong implication that there is something inherently reprehensible in advertising one’s dislike of a faith that sanctifies wife beating, marital rape, decapitating and crucifying unbelievers, amputating limbs for petty crimes and killing apostates, to name what to an infidel such as myself and no doubt millions of others are just some of its more objectionable practices. As I have already asked, why is it that there are no equivalent terms applicable to a similar distaste for the tenets of other faiths, such as ‘Christianphobia’ or ‘Hinduphobia’? But by now you should know the answer.

My *Chambers* dictionary defines ‘phobia’ as ‘a fear, aversion or hatred, especially a morbid or irrational one’. It therefore follows that in its literal sense, and in law, that is where matters should stay, with the word ‘Islamophobia’ meaning an irrational fear or hatred of Islam. What possible grounds can there be to make it a criminal offence to fear (rationally or otherwise) or for that matter hate an *idea*? As far as the law and medical science are concerned, a phobia is not a crime but an abnormal medical condition, for example agoraphobia, a fear of crowded places. Fear that is not irrational, but well-founded, as I, again along with millions of other non-Muslims, believe fear of Islam is, is one example of what is a perfectly natural and necessary human (and animal) instinct, fear, one that has evolved through the mechanism of natural selection to protect life from danger. And can who honestly deny that of all the worlds’ faith, because of the actions of many of its followers, Islam is the most to be feared? Fear that is irrational, deriving from the same source, the instinct for self-preservation, but unwarranted, is no less spontaneous, not wilful. No-one chooses to be afraid, rationally or otherwise, as distinct from choosing to being cautious when we are. Therefore, to attempt to banish or curb fear by punitive legislation is an act of sheer lunacy, especially when, in the case of Islam, it is indisputably well grounded. So if the term is correctly construed, which it never is, to mean a not a hatred of Muslims, but an irrational fear (or hatred) of what they believe, we are therefore confronted by the absurdity of making it a crime to irrationally fear or hate a system of beliefs. And yet fear, or rather ‘terror’, of Islam is explicitly what the author of the *Koran* intended to arouse in non-believers, with the threat to ‘cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve’ (8:13) and ‘strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of Allah’. (8: 60)

Did Miliband intend to make it a crime to react to these threats in exactly the way Allah intends? Why punish the terrorised and not the terrorist? Even if we substitute hate for fear, we still left with a law that seeks to criminalise hating, rationally or otherwise, *an idea*. As I have already asked, and I ask again, *if*, hypothetically, the intention is to make hating Islam illegal, then why is the same legal protection not being extended to all other doctrines, be they religious or secular? Why not 'Quakerphobia', 'Naziphobia' and 'anarchophobia'? Using the law to stop people hating an idea is as insane as compelling people to love a piece of music, since, like a number of human emotions, hate is a spontaneous feeling over which we have no control. One cannot choose to hate any more than one can to love. But certain manifestations of hate, specifically threats of or actual bodily violence against the object of the hate, are rightly actionable under existing laws.

If by 'Islam' in the word 'Islamophobia' is meant Muslim, as its false usage implies, then the term should be changed so that it not only, at least for some, implies, but actually says, Muslimophobia. Now, with this newly minted term, we can start afresh, and see where the proposed new law might take us. Unlike Islamophobia, Muslimophobia does mean an irrational fear or hatred of Muslims. So, we ask again, as this is a medical condition (for why else the term 'phobia'?), should this be a crime? However, deliberately seeking to *cause* fear by making verbal threats, as in the above citations from the *Koran*, or by gestures is, quite rightly, a crime under UK law, 'common assault'. Some time after I made these observations, I was gratified to read that Maajid Nawaz of the reformist Quilliam Foundation largely agrees with me: 'To scrutinize and challenge an idea like religion that comes with so much power must surely be the right of every free-thinking individual and formed the very basis of Europe's Enlightenment. That is why the word "Islamophobia" is too blunt. It fails in principle to distinguish between hating Muslims and criticising Islamic doctrine.' To which I would add that hating Muslims *per se* should not be a crime either, but only acting upon it in ways that are themselves illegal, as specified above,

Another case that could arise would involve deliberately conveying in some way to a specific Muslim or group of Muslims, not Muslims as such, and without any (illegal) threats of violence, that they are feared or hated or both. But this too is madness. We know that there are Muslims who definitely want to be feared, just as the *Koran* requires. Using the same terminology as Allah, unless we work for the BBC, we call them terrorists. Surely it is they who are breaking the law, not those who fear them. And some would argue that Muslims who carry out or approve of atrocities on the scale of 9/11, 7/7 or the Paris and Madrid massacres should expect to be hated. Is this the hypothetical offence, that of hating Muslim terrorists, the one that Miliband had in mind? Surely not. In lieu of any specific indicators as to Miliband's legal proposals, by a process of elimination, we arrive at the only possible rational conclusion, that his intention must have been not to criminalise fear or even hatred of an idea, Islam, nor fear of Muslims, but only hatred of Muslims, and at that, only as Muslims, because one can surely be entitled to harbour and even express feelings of hatred towards a person or persons for what they have done, for example the gang rape of a child, irrespective of and as distinct from what the rapists claim they believe. Always assuming we can arrive at a satisfactory definition of what hate is (and this will have its difficulties for sure), there then arises the problem of defining its

manifestations...verbal, visual, textual etc. And will the law apply to someone who advertises their hate for Muslims *per se*, or only for those who hate a specific Muslim, or group of Muslims, not for their religion, but for what they have done, even though it may have been inspired by it, such the Caliph of the Islamic State, and/or those UK subjects who have volunteered to fight for him and committed appalling acts of brutality and sadism? But by now, it should have become obvious that our projected crime of Muslim hatred, which by using the Greek prefix *miso* for hate, as in misogynist, should be designated *misomuslimia*, is already covered by laws relating to the incitement of religious hatred in general, which are so worded to ensure, despite the intentions and efforts of Tony Blair, that such laws do not protect religions, but only persons who believe in them. But even here, there are anomalies. Why is it illegal to 'incite hatred' against a person or persons on account of their religion, but not their politics? Why should it be potentially illegal to say to or about a particular Muslim that I hate him (or her) for the way he or she insults and abuses Jews and gays, praises Hitler and denies the Holocaust, but it be within the law to say exactly the same to or about a secular Nazi? I also find it puzzling, to say the least, that it should be a crime under the Public Order Act of 1986, and the Act of 2006 amplifying it, to incite hatred of a person or persons on account of their racial, religious or other identity, but for it not to be a crime to express a hatred of the same person or persons if there is no proven intention to incite others to do the same...for example, a personal racial insult that only its recipient hears. I stand to be corrected, but I know of no other law which criminalises the urging of others to do something which is not itself against the law. A ruling by the US Supreme Court makes no such distinction. So-called 'hate speech', including inciting racial hatred, is protected as free speech by the First Amendment, whereas speech inciting acts of violence, so-called 'fighting words', are not so protected, because such acts are themselves unlawful.

UK laws that criminalise the 'inciting' or 'stirring up' of this or that deplorable, but still legal belief – for example, that one race is superior or inferior to another (the *Koran* says exactly this about Jews, who are not human but 'apes and swine') - rest on the assumption, which I find demeaning and paternalistic, that perfectly decent people will, like sheep or robots, suddenly embrace obnoxious opinions about their fellow men and women simply because someone, who will almost certainly be a total stranger, and therefore not one whose opinion should be automatically trusted and acted upon, encourages them to do so with a few words or gestures. Where is the evidence that this is the case? And to compound the absurdity of such laws, they are redundant, because those who already hold these opinions will not need any 'inciting'. Public or on-line racial insults of an aggressive nature directed at specific persons, as occurred following England's defeat by Italy in a penalty shoot-out in the 2021 final of the European cup, as distinct from someone simply expressing a negative opinion about people of another race (such as 'all blacks are lazy', 'all Jews are mean', or 'all whites are racists') can and should be prosecuted as 'common assault', which, if racially motivated, as it was in the cases referred to, carries a maximum prison sentence of two years.

There are also other ways in which existing and projected so-called 'hate speech' laws have created or could create any number of absurdities and anomalies. Could it be a criminal offence, for example, to violate Sharia law by

creating and then displaying images of Mohammed where they might be seen by Muslims? When organisers of a free speech event in the Dallas suburb of Garland did precisely that on May 3, 2015, their right to do so was protected by both the First Amendment and armed police, who shot dead two pro-ISIS Muslim gunmen who were intent on providing the world with yet another demonstration of Islam's 'proud tradition of tolerance' by attempting to re-enact the Paris *Charlie Hebdo* massacre of January 7, 2015. The reader is invited to contrast Miliband's thought crime proposals with the statement made by Garland Mayor Douglas Athas after the thwarted attack: 'There was concern, which is why we had heightened security in the area, but we all swear to uphold the Constitution: free speech, free assembly and in this case possibly free religion.' It is reasonable to assume that under Miliband's proposed new laws, if anyone had been brave enough to organise a similar event in the UK it would have been a question who got to them first, armed Muslim assassins, or police armed with arrest warrants.

Miliband's proposals were bad enough in themselves. But their vagueness was even worse, because they would have left the voting public in the dark, in the event of a Labour government being elected, as to what it would have been possible to say without running the risk of ending up in court and possibly even in prison. All we were told was that Islamophobes were to be punished by toughening up and adding to laws that are currently on the statute book and have already led to a number of successful prosecutions. For example, given his declared intentions, it is reasonable to suppose that it could have become a criminal offence under Miliband's proposed anti-Islamophobia laws for a non-Muslim to say in public, or in print, something about Islam that is demonstrably true, such as the *Koran's* sanctioning of wife beating (Chapter 4, Verse 34) or the amputation of hands and feet for theft (Chapter 5, Verse 39) or that an adult male emulating, with a nine year old girl, Mohammed's consummation of his marriage to his last wife Aisha, as recorded in the relevant *Hadith* (e.g., Sahih Bukhari 4.1.1), would be liable to conviction as a paedophile under existing UK sexual offences laws. And as we have seen, saying just that led in Austria to prosecution and a conviction upheld on appeal by the European Court of Justice

A law which criminalises saying something that it is demonstrably true, and which does not endanger the security of the state or materially harm any individual, is manifestly and inherently an unjust law. Why then did Miliband propose to add more of the same to those we already have? Both the above statements are true, because there are Islamic texts to prove it, and they would also be endorsed as true by any honest Muslim cleric or scholar. But they would nevertheless run the risk, even under current thought crime laws, of being seen as Islamophobic not only by overly sensitive Muslims but also by zealous politically correct police. (See above) Supposing, as is plausible, that the proposed legislation had been so framed that these and other similar statements, all culled from authentic Islamic sources, would only have been actionable if made by non-Muslims, what then would have ensued would have been two sets of laws, one for Muslims, and another for the rest; in fact, the very Sharia law that many Muslims are currently demanding. This is not so absurd as it might sound. Such a law has been proposed in Canada and demanded at the United Nations by Doudou Diene, the UN's special rapporteur on 'racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance'. In 2007, in response to the drive by the OIC to criminalise Islamophobia, Diene proposed the adoption of a law binding on all UN member

states that would define 'quoting from the *Koran* accurately but critically [sic] as an act of bigotry'. Such quotations 'needed to be proscribed'. Diene explained why:

One may note a number of Islamophobic statements have been falsely claimed to be scientific or scholarly in order to give intellectual clout to arguments that link Islam to violence and terrorism. [The very idea!] Furthermore, the manipulation [sic] and selective [sic] quoting of sacred texts, in particular the *Koran*, as a means to deceptively [sic] argue that these texts show the violent nature of Islam has become current practice.

If such a law, applicable only to non-Muslims, were to have been had been enacted in the UK, we would then have found ourselves in the humiliating situation of being the only country in the world that had repealed its blasphemy laws protecting Christianity only to have had them replaced with new blasphemy laws applicable only to non-Muslims and protecting only Islam. If on the other hand such a law had been so framed as to have applied to everyone, then legislation designed ostensibly to protect the Islamic faith would have made it illegal for not only infidels, but for Muslims to cite certain passages from their own holy books. And we have seen already, in the case of the Taunton Preacher, a Muslim magistrate convicting a Christian whose offence consisted of reading out in public a passage from the Bible.

A novel, but also retrogressive, solution was been proposed by a Labour MP, Keith Vaz, to ensure the protection of Islam from criticism. Vaz, a devout Roman Catholic, in March 1989 led a march of several thousand Muslims in his own constituency of Leicester to demand that Salman Rushdie's novel, *The Satanic Verses*, be banned. Consistent with his support for Sharia censorship, Vaz (a close friend of many years of Jeremy Corbyn), with Islam obviously in mind, advocated the re-introduction of the Blasphemy Laws, extended to cover all religions rather than just Christianity. Justifying what would constitute an unprecedented clamp down on free speech, he argued at an event convened by the Muslim Council of Britain on November 12, 2015, that 'religions are very special to people' and, we could add, especially so to the Muslim assassins who, the very next day, massacred 131 civilians in Paris to cries of God is Great. But so are other beliefs 'very special' if not to his Muslim friends, for example democracy, secularism, and the right to free speech, yet nobody in their right minds would propose that advocates of Muslim theocracy who criticise them should be subject to criminal proceedings. Those who believe in democracy and free speech are perfectly capable of defending their principles without the assistance of the police, and the courts, or resorting to terrorist violence. So why not Muslims?

With a view to yet further tightening of laws that curtail what can be said about Islam, the Corbynised Labour Party and, belying their name, the Liberal Democrats, defined Islamophobia as 'a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimism [sic] or perceived Muslimness [sic!]'. Since they were terms intended to be used in a court of law, what, precisely, were 'Muslimism' and 'Muslimness'? Did they mean a belief in Islam? If not, what did they mean? Even the police and Muslim clerics joined academics and secularists who protested to Home Secretary Sajid Javid that if enacted into law, this definition of Islamophobia, quite apart from inventing words whose meanings were not explained and yet again conflated

race with religion, would create a blasphemy law drastically inhibiting criticism of Islam. By so doing, it would, contrary to the intentions of those proposing it, further fuel the already existing hostility towards a faith that is widely perceived as enjoying privileges neither demanded by nor afforded to any other.

It is not only in the United Nations and the UK that in the name of combating Islamophobia, serious proposals are being made to impose ever tighter restrictions on what can be legally said about Islam. While in the USA, to the palpable chagrin and frustrations of much of the left, free speech about religion is protected from such assaults on personal freedom by its First Amendment, to the north, in Canada, no such bulwark exists. There, in September 2015, Minister of Justice Stephanie Vallée brought before Quebec's National Assembly Bill 59, whose ostensible purpose was to criminalise the ubiquitous 'hate speech'. However, it became evident that something more specific was in mind when Jacques Fremont, Quebec's Human Rights (sic) Commissioner, revealed that if the Bill were to become law, he would use it to prosecute 'people who would write about the Islamic religion on a website or a Facebook page'. Not criticise, but merely 'write about'! As in the UK with Miliband's proposals, under this law, offenders would be entered onto a hate speech offenders' register and being fined up to \$10,000 for 'writing about' Islam. Human Rights in Quebec are clearly in safe hands.

In the case of Miliband's proposed, though not defined, new laws, always assuming that they were intended to be implemented, and were not simply a ruse to attract the Muslim vote, only to be quietly laid to rest once the election was over, the proposed legal suppression of 'Islamophobia' would have required not only a wide extension of police powers, but the involvement of border agencies to prevent the importation of printed matter deemed 'Islamophobic', the surveillance and if necessary the blocking of the electronic transmission of offending texts and images such as is currently practised by China, North Korea and a number of Islamic regimes, and more police raids on newsagents, as well as on internet cafes, book shops and libraries, and possibly even private homes. Considerations such as these suggest that Miliband, in his eagerness to court the Muslim vote, either had simply not thought the matter through, or that he really believed that like the Sharia left and the rest of the political establishment, not offending Muslims outweighed the right to free speech and a free press.

But worst of all is that enacting legislation empowering the police to 'record Islamophobic attacks right across the country' would have encouraged offence-seeking Muslims, the politically correct and Sharia leftists to act as police informers. While no one in their private capacity as citizen would have been obliged to report to the police an Islamophobic offence, as the law stands, all public officials (whose numbers run into the millions) when acting in that capacity would have had such a duty, as defined by the Criminal Law Act of 1967. This would have created a thought control police on such a vast scale that a free discussion of Islam could only have been safely pursued in the privacy of one's own home. (As the saying goes, an Englishman's home is a castle. But not in Scotland, if the SNP's Muslim Cabinet Secretary for Justice, Humza Yusuf, had got his way. He excluded from his hate crime bill the clause that in the UK 1986 Public Order act, protected from prosecution 'behavior', 'words' or 'images' performed, uttered or displayed 'in a dwelling' (i.e., a private home) that would be actionable in public.)

Free speech and a free press were obviously not on Miliband's agenda, at least, not when he was being interviewed by the editor of the *Muslim News*. Had it occurred to him that if the beefed-up thought crime laws he was proposing had already been on the statute book, they would for sure have resulted in the prosecution of anyone in the UK re-printing, re-producing, offering for sale and even possibly just possessing a copy of the post-massacre edition of *Charlie Hebdo*? Perhaps Miliband had already forgotten that only three months previously, on the very day of the Paris massacre, he had declared to the House of Commons: 'We stand in solidarity with the people of France against this evil terrorist attack by people [sic] intent on attacking our democratic way of life and freedom of speech'. If we understand Miliband correctly (and that is not easy), the attack on *Charlie Hebdo* constituted 'an attack on freedom of speech', which indeed it most certainly was, though as is standard procedure on such occasions, he did not say by whom or why. But if again we understand Miliband aright, his proposed anti-Islamophobia laws would have also necessitated an 'attack on free speech', outlawing the kind of images that led to the assassinations in Paris. These two positions cannot be reconciled. Trapped as he was between what he saw as the necessity of appeasing incessant Muslim demands for the criminalisation of anything that smacked of criticism of Islam, and the need to reassure the broader public that he upheld 'our democratic way of life and freedom of speech', Miliband found himself defending principles that were totally and obviously incompatible.

The open-ended legislation proposed by Miliband was, at that point in time, the most extreme of a series of attempts by politicians to devise laws that would further curtail freedom of speech. However, flushed with his unexpected outright election victory on May 7, 2015, David Cameron, no longer constrained by his former Liberal Democrat coalition partners, announced his intention to crack down on 'extremism', by which term was meant the Islamic variety. The proposals he had in mind went far beyond even what had been implied by Miliband in his war on Islamophobia. Miliband wanted to change the law but remain within it. Cameron, incredibly and unambiguously, proposed to circumvent it: 'For far too long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to our citizens, as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone.' So we should become aggressively intolerant...like some Muslims? This is the same Cameron who in the wake the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre proclaimed to the world from the steps of No. 10 Downing Street his belief in freedom of speech. Hitherto, freedom of expression had been increasingly curtailed by so-called 'hate crime' laws that have been approved by Parliament. Indefensible as they from a free speech standpoint, they were subject to debate and amendment, and in their final wording at least gave an indication of what can and cannot be said in public about certain matters and afforded those so accused the right to defend themselves in a court of law.

What Cameron proposed implied an intention, by methods not at the time specified, but that did not have the force of law, to augment the already existing legal constraints on free speech. That and that alone was the meaning of his warning that certain people are 'not to be left alone' even if they conform to the law. The reasonable assumption that the intended target of this extra-legal attack on what remains of freedom of speech was 'extremist' Muslims was totally irrelevant. Whoever they might prove to be, they had as much right to free speech as anyone else. Perhaps the time is approaching when those who value their right

to free expression will be called upon to act in the spirit, if not strictly the letter, of Voltaire's axiom, 'I despise what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it', by defending even those who say, 'I despise what you say, and if I could, I would put you to death for saying it.'

If it was integration that Cameron was seeking, this was hardly the best way to go about it. How ironic that Cameron's proposed assault on the rule of law came only a matter of weeks before the 800th anniversary of the adoption of Magna Carta on June 15, 1215, subsequently condemned by Pope Innocent III as heretical for its placing secular limits on the power of god's anointed sovereign. Cameron's proposed measure violated one of the Charter's three articles, number 39, which still remain on the statute book: 'No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of the land.' The proposed measures also violated what is regarded as the bedrock of all (western) law: '*Nullum crimen, nulla poena sin praevia lege poenali*'; No crime can be committed, or punishment inflicted, without a pre-existing criminal law. Cameron's threat became a reality with the proposal, following his election victory in May 2015, to enforce 'Extremist Disruption Orders' to silence Muslims deemed 'extremist', a term reminiscent of Apartheid South Africa's 'Banning Orders'. No longer would obeying the law of the land' be sufficient protection. The days of 'passive tolerance' were over.

Miliband, who as we have noted, is an atheist, would surely insist that his convictions, though entirely secular, are no less sincere and deeply held than those of a religious believer. So why then did he advocate legal protection for one, but not the other? On what grounds does UK law not treat all beliefs equally, as does the constitution of the USA? And if beliefs are not to be treated equally, as Miliband, proposed, then it follows inescapably that neither are those who hold them. Even under current thought crime laws, a Muslim cannot be prosecuted for negative comments about socialism, but a socialist can end up in prison, just as he could in an Islamic country, for negative comments about Islam. So in effect, there are already two systems of law in operation, working to the advantage of Muslims and discriminating against infidels. Cameron's proposals did not remedy this situation, but simply complicated it further. It needs to be said that Miliband, possibly trying to over-compensate for his own lack of faith, had form on this issue, voting in 2006 for Christian zealot Tony Blair's failed attempt to introduce a law that would have criminalised 'insulting religion'. How is it possible to insult an idea? How can it be a criminal offence to insult either the ideas or, for that matter, the person of someone who died thirteen hundred years ago? Under UK law, (but not, as we have seen, Austrian) only the living can be libelled, defamed or slandered. An attempt to change this law was rejected in the House of Commons in 2012. Justice Minister Jonathon Djanogly ruled that 'a case for damage can only be brought by the person, no matter how revered, who has suffered the injury, loss or, in this case, damage to his or her reputation.' To provide for the protection of the reputation of the dead, in the case under our consideration, that of the prophet Mohammed, would therefore constitute one more concession by our legislators to Sharia law. Perhaps as a sign of times to come (Corbyn was elected Labour Leader four months later), at a Labour Party pre-election rally in Birmingham on May 2, 2015, the audience was segregated by

gender, with a photo clearly showing women sitting to the left as they faced the platform, and men to the right. Yet previously, when the news first broke of university student meetings being similarly segregated by gender if addressed by Muslim speakers, the Labour Party had promised that if elected, it would ensure that this practice would be outlawed. Justifying Sharia gender segregation at its own meeting, a Labour Party spokesman ingenuously claimed that men and women were being treated as equals, because 'everyone was together in the same room'...just as they were at the gender segregated university meetings the Labour Party promised to outlaw. So here we had the Labour Party abiding by Sharia law even before it was elected.

